Protections for whistleblowers: what employers need to know
Article provided courtesy of
Under federal and state laws, 鈥渨histleblowers鈥� 鈥� individuals who expose employer misconduct 鈥� are protected against retaliation under certain circumstances. However, with the growing array of statutes and regulations seeking to regulate whistleblowing, insurers and insureds should be well-versed in potential retaliation actions that may be asserted by employees who 鈥渂low the whistle.鈥� Discussed herein are recent developments concerning three of the most significant laws protecting whistleblowers: the Dodd-Frank Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Employers and insurers should note that many states also have whistleblowing protections that are broader than the protections available under federal statutes.
I. Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower protections require more than internal reporting, federal appeals court rules
In a departure from a steady stream of federal district court decisions broadly construing the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (鈥淒FA鈥�), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in New Orleans, has limited the scope of the term 鈥渨histleblower鈥� under those provisions to apply only to employees who actually report information relating to a violation of securities laws to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(鈥淪EC鈥�), thus reducing employers鈥� exposure to such claims. Asadi v. G.E. Energy, No. 12-20522 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013).
Khaled Asadi, a former G.E. Energy executive, alleged he was fired after reporting a possible securities law violation to his supervisor and the company鈥檚 regional ombudsman. Asadi claimed he was protected by the anti-retaliation provisions of the DFA, even though, indisputably, he did not provide any information to the SEC, and therefore, did not meet the express statutory definition of the term 鈥渨histleblower.鈥� Instead, he argued that his internal reports were protected based on purportedly conflicting language in the statute鈥檚 anti-retaliation provision. He argued that the DFA鈥檚 anti-retaliation provision protects those who make disclosures that are protected under SOX, even if they do not report a violation to the SEC.
Rejecting Asadi鈥檚 argument, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain language and structure of the statute compelled the conclusion that internal communications alone were not protected. It so doing, the Court disagreed with numerous district court decisions that have held to the contrary. See, e.g., Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41302 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 n.9 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). It also rejected the SEC鈥檚 similar administrative interpretation of the statute.
Based on district court decisions, many employers, not surprisingly, had begun to question whether internal reporting mechanisms they had adopted were simply a trap waiting to ensnare them in DFA whistleblower litigation, rather than the constructive vehicle they had envisioned for achieving compliance through transparency and self-regulation. The Fifth Circuit鈥檚 decision may provide a welcome tonic for employers鈥� concerns.
In light of Asadi, employers should re-evaluate and update their corporate internal reporting mechanisms or so-called whistleblower hotlines. Supported by employee awareness programs, these avenues of communication should encourage internal reporting. Adopting clear language and process, articulating strong assurances from senior management of protection from retaliation, and managing expectations of those who employ the procedure to make reports also are essential.
Employers must manage internal resources effectively. They must respond promptly, conduct diligent internal review, take appropriate corrective action, and self-report as warranted. Employees of organizations that deliver on their promises are less likely to resort to the SEC. While reporting to the SEC ultimately may be warranted in some situations, the employer will have the opportunity to be involved and in some measure to affect the course of events.
II. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
A. Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act apply to employees of private contractors? Supreme Court to give answer
Through Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (鈥淪OX鈥�), a federal statute that applies to publically-traded companies, Congress created a private cause of action for individuals who have suffered retaliation after reporting fraud or violations of securities regulations. The section provides that no company covered by SOX or 鈥渁ny officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee鈥� in providing information of a potential violation of SOX. 18 U.S.C. 搂1514A(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to determine whether an employee of a private employer can invoke the SOX whistleblower provision against that private company, solely because the private company is a contractor of a SOX-covered entity. In the first SOX case it has accepted, the Court will review the First Circuit鈥檚 decision in Lawson v. FMR, LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), wherein the appeals court ruled that employees of privately-held companies are not covered by the Section 806 whistleblower protections of SOX even if their employer does business with a publicly-traded company. The Department of Labor鈥檚 (鈥淒OL鈥�) Administrative Review Board (鈥淎RB鈥�), however, reached the opposite conclusion in Spinner v. David Landau & Associates, LLC, ARB Nos. 10-111, 10-115 (May 31, 2012). Seeking to expand SOX鈥檚 reach, the ARB held that Section 806 applies to employees of privately-held companies if they have contracts with publicly-traded companies.
Lawson involved two former employees of privately-held companies providing investment advice and fund management services to publicly-held mutual funds. They claimed their employer had retaliated against them for reporting alleged improper registration statements and accounting practices in violation of SOX. Determining that this case did not fall within the protections of Section 806, the First Circuit court rejected the plaintiffs鈥� contention that an 鈥渆mployee鈥� afforded whistleblower protection under SOX includes not only the employees of public companies, but also the employees of that company鈥檚 contractors and subcontractors. See Lawson, 670 F.3d at 67-68. Further, the court found the meaning of 鈥渆mployee鈥� to be unambiguous within the context of Section 806 and that, under the Chevron case, the court therefore owed no deference to a contrary DOL interpretation. (The Supreme Court ruled in Chevron that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes will be upheld so long as they are reasonable.)
In contrast, Spinner considered whether the plaintiff, an employee of a privately-held internal auditing firm offering services to publicly-traded companies, was entitled to protection under Section 806. Finding in favor of the plaintiff and rejecting the First Circuit鈥檚 interpretation in Lawson, the ARB announced that 鈥渁ccountants employed by private accounting firms, who in turn provide SOX compliance services to publicly traded corporations, are covered as employees of contractors under Section 806.鈥�
The Supreme Court鈥檚 review of Lawson presents three important concerns:
- Whether Section 806 extends to employees of private companies who have contracts with public companies;
- How much deference federal courts should afford interpretations of the Department of Labor; and,
- Whether the Section 806 issue currently is ripe for review by the Supreme Court.
A Supreme Court ruling that Section 806 applies to employees of private contractors would expand the scope of the provision鈥檚 whistleblower protection greatly, while a contrary ruling will act as a restraint on the current ARB/DOL, which many consider to be seeking to expand the application of SOX. The Court likely will take this opportunity to decide whether federal courts should defer to the DOL鈥檚 construction of SOX, clarifying the proper relationship between federal courts and the DOL regarding interpretation of Section 806. Employers should continue to limit their exposure to retaliation claims by implementing strong internal reporting mechanisms and taking whistleblower complaints seriously.
B. Third Circuit adopts DOL鈥檚 liberal test for determining protected whistleblower activity under SOX
Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first federal Circuit Court to adopt the liberal 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard for determining protected activity under the whistleblower provisions of SOX. Wiest v. Lynch, No. 11-4257 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 2013). In doing so, the court rejected case law requiring a plaintiff-employee鈥檚 internal complaint to relate 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� to a statute or regulation specified in Section 806 of SOX in order for the employee鈥檚 communication to be considered protected activity. The Third Circuit鈥檚 holding represents a significant, employee-friendly development in cases brought under SOX鈥檚 whistleblower provision. The Court has jurisdiction over Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Jeffrey Wiest, a former accountant for the defendant company, filed a complaint alleging his former employer had terminated his employment in violation of SOX after he raised concerns to his supervisors about certain corporate expenditures. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the employer鈥檚 motion to dismiss Wiest鈥檚 claims. It found the concerns Wiest raised did not meet the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard announced by the ARB in Platone v. FLYi, ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006). Under the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard, to be protected, an employee鈥檚 communication regarding suspected fraud had to assert specific elements of securities fraud.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of two of the Wiest鈥檚 SOX retaliation claims. In doing so, the Court adopted the 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard first articulated by the ARB in Sylvester v. Parexel International, LLC, ARB No. 07-123, ALJ Nos. 2007-SOX-39, 42 (ARB May 25, 2011). Under the 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard, employees making internal communication regarding questionable conduct need only believe the objectionable conduct violates a SOX provision, provided that a person with the same training and experience also would think the complained-about conduct could violate the Act. Although Sylvester was announced in May 2011, no Circuit Court had adopted the decision or rejected the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard 鈥� until now. In fact, even after Sylvester, many district courts continued to use the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard in ruling on SOX whistleblower claims, leading even the DOL to wrestle with the impact of Sylvester on new SOX claims.
In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge Kent A. Jordan observed in Wiest that it would be difficult for an employer to know or suspect an employee has engaged in protected conduct if the employee does not adequately communicate his or her concerns in an understandable way to the employer. Judge Jordan echoed Platone when he observed that 鈥淸w]hat matters is not what is locked in the plaintiff鈥檚 mind or how the plaintiff may later describe his actions; it is what is communicated to the employer that counts.鈥�
Wiest represents a significant development in SOX jurisprudence. Moreover, it is an expansion of employee rights in this area of law that cannot be overstated. The decision makes an employer鈥檚 duty to investigate claims of corporate fraud more difficult and complicates an employer鈥檚 ability to take necessary employment action with respect to potential whistleblowers.
III. Government releases long-awaited Foreign Corrupt Practices Act resource guide
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (鈥淔CPA鈥�) prohibits bribery of foreign officials. Essentially, the FPCA prohibits an 鈥渋ssuer鈥� 鈥� a U.S. company that issues securities 鈥� or any of its officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders to: 1) make use of interstate commerce (mail or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce); 2) corruptly; 3) in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to; 4) a foreign official 鈥� directly or indirectly; 5) for the purpose of influencing that foreign official.
At the end of 2012, the Department of Justice (鈥淒OJ鈥�) and the SEC issued their much-awaited regulatory guidance entitled, 鈥淎 Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act.鈥� The guide is a comprehensive overview of the FCPA. More importantly, it describes the DOJ鈥檚 and the SEC鈥檚 enforcement approach and priorities in relation to the FCPA. Therefore, the guide, released November 14, 2012, provides critical insight as to how these regulatory and law enforcement organizations will assess potentially wrongful conduct within corporate organizations. It also offers insight on how these agencies will determine whether to hold an employer organization responsible for the misdeeds of its employees or agents.
The guide acknowledges that each investigation requires fact-specific review and analysis. It notes that presence of a corporate compliance program is a common factor in determining whether there will be organizational liability and whether the organization will be subject to prosecution, regulatory fines, or otherwise shielded from responsibility. In the guide, the DOJ and SEC take a 鈥渃ommon-sense and pragmatic approach鈥� to evaluating an organization鈥檚 compliance program by asking three simple, albeit broad, questions:
- Is the company鈥檚 compliance program well-designed?
- Is it being applied in good faith?
- Does it work?
Applying the guidance offered by the guide, the following are some of the 鈥渉allmarks鈥� of an effective compliance program:
- Commitment from senior management and a clearly articulated policy against corruption
- Code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures
- Oversight, autonomy, and resources
- Risk assessment
- Training and continuing advice
- Incentives and disciplinary measures
- Third-party due diligence and payments
- Confidential reporting and internal investigations
- Continuous Improvement: periodic testing and review
- Pre-acquisition due diligence and post-acquisition integration (in the context of mergers and acquisitions)
The new guide now makes clear that effective compliance programs not only are a requirement, but an essential tool for an organization鈥檚 own survival and well-being. Company boards, senior management teams, and corporate officers are unequivocally on notice that mediocre compliance programs represent a dereliction of duty. Moreover, compliance programs assist employers in successfully defending against whistleblower claims.
The time is now for employers to develop, update, or polish-off their corporate compliance programs. As important as any capital asset, a best practice corporate compliance program can literally mean the difference between an organization that prospers (notwithstanding the misdeeds of wayward employees) or an organization that falters in the face of an FCPA problem.
Related resources
Protections for whistleblowers: what employers need to know
Article provided courtesy of
Under federal and state laws, 鈥渨histleblowers鈥� 鈥� individuals who expose employer misconduct 鈥� are protected against retaliation under certain circumstances. However, with the growing array of statutes and regulations seeking to regulate whistleblowing, insurers and insureds should be well-versed in potential retaliation actions that may be asserted by employees who 鈥渂low the whistle.鈥� Discussed herein are recent developments concerning three of the most significant laws protecting whistleblowers: the Dodd-Frank Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Employers and insurers should note that many states also have whistleblowing protections that are broader than the protections available under federal statutes.
I. Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower protections require more than internal reporting, federal appeals court rules
In a departure from a steady stream of federal district court decisions broadly construing the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (鈥淒FA鈥�), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in New Orleans, has limited the scope of the term 鈥渨histleblower鈥� under those provisions to apply only to employees who actually report information relating to a violation of securities laws to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(鈥淪EC鈥�), thus reducing employers鈥� exposure to such claims. Asadi v. G.E. Energy, No. 12-20522 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013).
Khaled Asadi, a former G.E. Energy executive, alleged he was fired after reporting a possible securities law violation to his supervisor and the company鈥檚 regional ombudsman. Asadi claimed he was protected by the anti-retaliation provisions of the DFA, even though, indisputably, he did not provide any information to the SEC, and therefore, did not meet the express statutory definition of the term 鈥渨histleblower.鈥� Instead, he argued that his internal reports were protected based on purportedly conflicting language in the statute鈥檚 anti-retaliation provision. He argued that the DFA鈥檚 anti-retaliation provision protects those who make disclosures that are protected under SOX, even if they do not report a violation to the SEC.
Rejecting Asadi鈥檚 argument, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain language and structure of the statute compelled the conclusion that internal communications alone were not protected. It so doing, the Court disagreed with numerous district court decisions that have held to the contrary. See, e.g., Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41302 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 n.9 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). It also rejected the SEC鈥檚 similar administrative interpretation of the statute.
Based on district court decisions, many employers, not surprisingly, had begun to question whether internal reporting mechanisms they had adopted were simply a trap waiting to ensnare them in DFA whistleblower litigation, rather than the constructive vehicle they had envisioned for achieving compliance through transparency and self-regulation. The Fifth Circuit鈥檚 decision may provide a welcome tonic for employers鈥� concerns.
In light of Asadi, employers should re-evaluate and update their corporate internal reporting mechanisms or so-called whistleblower hotlines. Supported by employee awareness programs, these avenues of communication should encourage internal reporting. Adopting clear language and process, articulating strong assurances from senior management of protection from retaliation, and managing expectations of those who employ the procedure to make reports also are essential.
Employers must manage internal resources effectively. They must respond promptly, conduct diligent internal review, take appropriate corrective action, and self-report as warranted. Employees of organizations that deliver on their promises are less likely to resort to the SEC. While reporting to the SEC ultimately may be warranted in some situations, the employer will have the opportunity to be involved and in some measure to affect the course of events.
II. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
A. Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act apply to employees of private contractors? Supreme Court to give answer
Through Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (鈥淪OX鈥�), a federal statute that applies to publically-traded companies, Congress created a private cause of action for individuals who have suffered retaliation after reporting fraud or violations of securities regulations. The section provides that no company covered by SOX or 鈥渁ny officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee鈥� in providing information of a potential violation of SOX. 18 U.S.C. 搂1514A(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to determine whether an employee of a private employer can invoke the SOX whistleblower provision against that private company, solely because the private company is a contractor of a SOX-covered entity. In the first SOX case it has accepted, the Court will review the First Circuit鈥檚 decision in Lawson v. FMR, LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), wherein the appeals court ruled that employees of privately-held companies are not covered by the Section 806 whistleblower protections of SOX even if their employer does business with a publicly-traded company. The Department of Labor鈥檚 (鈥淒OL鈥�) Administrative Review Board (鈥淎RB鈥�), however, reached the opposite conclusion in Spinner v. David Landau & Associates, LLC, ARB Nos. 10-111, 10-115 (May 31, 2012). Seeking to expand SOX鈥檚 reach, the ARB held that Section 806 applies to employees of privately-held companies if they have contracts with publicly-traded companies.
Lawson involved two former employees of privately-held companies providing investment advice and fund management services to publicly-held mutual funds. They claimed their employer had retaliated against them for reporting alleged improper registration statements and accounting practices in violation of SOX. Determining that this case did not fall within the protections of Section 806, the First Circuit court rejected the plaintiffs鈥� contention that an 鈥渆mployee鈥� afforded whistleblower protection under SOX includes not only the employees of public companies, but also the employees of that company鈥檚 contractors and subcontractors. See Lawson, 670 F.3d at 67-68. Further, the court found the meaning of 鈥渆mployee鈥� to be unambiguous within the context of Section 806 and that, under the Chevron case, the court therefore owed no deference to a contrary DOL interpretation. (The Supreme Court ruled in Chevron that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes will be upheld so long as they are reasonable.)
In contrast, Spinner considered whether the plaintiff, an employee of a privately-held internal auditing firm offering services to publicly-traded companies, was entitled to protection under Section 806. Finding in favor of the plaintiff and rejecting the First Circuit鈥檚 interpretation in Lawson, the ARB announced that 鈥渁ccountants employed by private accounting firms, who in turn provide SOX compliance services to publicly traded corporations, are covered as employees of contractors under Section 806.鈥�
The Supreme Court鈥檚 review of Lawson presents three important concerns:
- Whether Section 806 extends to employees of private companies who have contracts with public companies;
- How much deference federal courts should afford interpretations of the Department of Labor; and,
- Whether the Section 806 issue currently is ripe for review by the Supreme Court.
A Supreme Court ruling that Section 806 applies to employees of private contractors would expand the scope of the provision鈥檚 whistleblower protection greatly, while a contrary ruling will act as a restraint on the current ARB/DOL, which many consider to be seeking to expand the application of SOX. The Court likely will take this opportunity to decide whether federal courts should defer to the DOL鈥檚 construction of SOX, clarifying the proper relationship between federal courts and the DOL regarding interpretation of Section 806. Employers should continue to limit their exposure to retaliation claims by implementing strong internal reporting mechanisms and taking whistleblower complaints seriously.
B. Third Circuit adopts DOL鈥檚 liberal test for determining protected whistleblower activity under SOX
Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first federal Circuit Court to adopt the liberal 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard for determining protected activity under the whistleblower provisions of SOX. Wiest v. Lynch, No. 11-4257 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 2013). In doing so, the court rejected case law requiring a plaintiff-employee鈥檚 internal complaint to relate 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� to a statute or regulation specified in Section 806 of SOX in order for the employee鈥檚 communication to be considered protected activity. The Third Circuit鈥檚 holding represents a significant, employee-friendly development in cases brought under SOX鈥檚 whistleblower provision. The Court has jurisdiction over Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Jeffrey Wiest, a former accountant for the defendant company, filed a complaint alleging his former employer had terminated his employment in violation of SOX after he raised concerns to his supervisors about certain corporate expenditures. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the employer鈥檚 motion to dismiss Wiest鈥檚 claims. It found the concerns Wiest raised did not meet the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard announced by the ARB in Platone v. FLYi, ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006). Under the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard, to be protected, an employee鈥檚 communication regarding suspected fraud had to assert specific elements of securities fraud.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of two of the Wiest鈥檚 SOX retaliation claims. In doing so, the Court adopted the 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard first articulated by the ARB in Sylvester v. Parexel International, LLC, ARB No. 07-123, ALJ Nos. 2007-SOX-39, 42 (ARB May 25, 2011). Under the 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard, employees making internal communication regarding questionable conduct need only believe the objectionable conduct violates a SOX provision, provided that a person with the same training and experience also would think the complained-about conduct could violate the Act. Although Sylvester was announced in May 2011, no Circuit Court had adopted the decision or rejected the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard 鈥� until now. In fact, even after Sylvester, many district courts continued to use the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard in ruling on SOX whistleblower claims, leading even the DOL to wrestle with the impact of Sylvester on new SOX claims.
In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge Kent A. Jordan observed in Wiest that it would be difficult for an employer to know or suspect an employee has engaged in protected conduct if the employee does not adequately communicate his or her concerns in an understandable way to the employer. Judge Jordan echoed Platone when he observed that 鈥淸w]hat matters is not what is locked in the plaintiff鈥檚 mind or how the plaintiff may later describe his actions; it is what is communicated to the employer that counts.鈥�
Wiest represents a significant development in SOX jurisprudence. Moreover, it is an expansion of employee rights in this area of law that cannot be overstated. The decision makes an employer鈥檚 duty to investigate claims of corporate fraud more difficult and complicates an employer鈥檚 ability to take necessary employment action with respect to potential whistleblowers.
III. Government releases long-awaited Foreign Corrupt Practices Act resource guide
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (鈥淔CPA鈥�) prohibits bribery of foreign officials. Essentially, the FPCA prohibits an 鈥渋ssuer鈥� 鈥� a U.S. company that issues securities 鈥� or any of its officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders to: 1) make use of interstate commerce (mail or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce); 2) corruptly; 3) in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to; 4) a foreign official 鈥� directly or indirectly; 5) for the purpose of influencing that foreign official.
At the end of 2012, the Department of Justice (鈥淒OJ鈥�) and the SEC issued their much-awaited regulatory guidance entitled, 鈥淎 Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act.鈥� The guide is a comprehensive overview of the FCPA. More importantly, it describes the DOJ鈥檚 and the SEC鈥檚 enforcement approach and priorities in relation to the FCPA. Therefore, the guide, released November 14, 2012, provides critical insight as to how these regulatory and law enforcement organizations will assess potentially wrongful conduct within corporate organizations. It also offers insight on how these agencies will determine whether to hold an employer organization responsible for the misdeeds of its employees or agents.
The guide acknowledges that each investigation requires fact-specific review and analysis. It notes that presence of a corporate compliance program is a common factor in determining whether there will be organizational liability and whether the organization will be subject to prosecution, regulatory fines, or otherwise shielded from responsibility. In the guide, the DOJ and SEC take a 鈥渃ommon-sense and pragmatic approach鈥� to evaluating an organization鈥檚 compliance program by asking three simple, albeit broad, questions:
- Is the company鈥檚 compliance program well-designed?
- Is it being applied in good faith?
- Does it work?
Applying the guidance offered by the guide, the following are some of the 鈥渉allmarks鈥� of an effective compliance program:
- Commitment from senior management and a clearly articulated policy against corruption
- Code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures
- Oversight, autonomy, and resources
- Risk assessment
- Training and continuing advice
- Incentives and disciplinary measures
- Third-party due diligence and payments
- Confidential reporting and internal investigations
- Continuous Improvement: periodic testing and review
- Pre-acquisition due diligence and post-acquisition integration (in the context of mergers and acquisitions)
The new guide now makes clear that effective compliance programs not only are a requirement, but an essential tool for an organization鈥檚 own survival and well-being. Company boards, senior management teams, and corporate officers are unequivocally on notice that mediocre compliance programs represent a dereliction of duty. Moreover, compliance programs assist employers in successfully defending against whistleblower claims.
The time is now for employers to develop, update, or polish-off their corporate compliance programs. As important as any capital asset, a best practice corporate compliance program can literally mean the difference between an organization that prospers (notwithstanding the misdeeds of wayward employees) or an organization that falters in the face of an FCPA problem.
Related resources
Protections for whistleblowers: what employers need to know
Article provided courtesy of
Under federal and state laws, 鈥渨histleblowers鈥� 鈥� individuals who expose employer misconduct 鈥� are protected against retaliation under certain circumstances. However, with the growing array of statutes and regulations seeking to regulate whistleblowing, insurers and insureds should be well-versed in potential retaliation actions that may be asserted by employees who 鈥渂low the whistle.鈥� Discussed herein are recent developments concerning three of the most significant laws protecting whistleblowers: the Dodd-Frank Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Employers and insurers should note that many states also have whistleblowing protections that are broader than the protections available under federal statutes.
I. Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower protections require more than internal reporting, federal appeals court rules
In a departure from a steady stream of federal district court decisions broadly construing the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (鈥淒FA鈥�), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in New Orleans, has limited the scope of the term 鈥渨histleblower鈥� under those provisions to apply only to employees who actually report information relating to a violation of securities laws to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(鈥淪EC鈥�), thus reducing employers鈥� exposure to such claims. Asadi v. G.E. Energy, No. 12-20522 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013).
Khaled Asadi, a former G.E. Energy executive, alleged he was fired after reporting a possible securities law violation to his supervisor and the company鈥檚 regional ombudsman. Asadi claimed he was protected by the anti-retaliation provisions of the DFA, even though, indisputably, he did not provide any information to the SEC, and therefore, did not meet the express statutory definition of the term 鈥渨histleblower.鈥� Instead, he argued that his internal reports were protected based on purportedly conflicting language in the statute鈥檚 anti-retaliation provision. He argued that the DFA鈥檚 anti-retaliation provision protects those who make disclosures that are protected under SOX, even if they do not report a violation to the SEC.
Rejecting Asadi鈥檚 argument, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain language and structure of the statute compelled the conclusion that internal communications alone were not protected. It so doing, the Court disagreed with numerous district court decisions that have held to the contrary. See, e.g., Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41302 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 n.9 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). It also rejected the SEC鈥檚 similar administrative interpretation of the statute.
Based on district court decisions, many employers, not surprisingly, had begun to question whether internal reporting mechanisms they had adopted were simply a trap waiting to ensnare them in DFA whistleblower litigation, rather than the constructive vehicle they had envisioned for achieving compliance through transparency and self-regulation. The Fifth Circuit鈥檚 decision may provide a welcome tonic for employers鈥� concerns.
In light of Asadi, employers should re-evaluate and update their corporate internal reporting mechanisms or so-called whistleblower hotlines. Supported by employee awareness programs, these avenues of communication should encourage internal reporting. Adopting clear language and process, articulating strong assurances from senior management of protection from retaliation, and managing expectations of those who employ the procedure to make reports also are essential.
Employers must manage internal resources effectively. They must respond promptly, conduct diligent internal review, take appropriate corrective action, and self-report as warranted. Employees of organizations that deliver on their promises are less likely to resort to the SEC. While reporting to the SEC ultimately may be warranted in some situations, the employer will have the opportunity to be involved and in some measure to affect the course of events.
II. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
A. Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act apply to employees of private contractors? Supreme Court to give answer
Through Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (鈥淪OX鈥�), a federal statute that applies to publically-traded companies, Congress created a private cause of action for individuals who have suffered retaliation after reporting fraud or violations of securities regulations. The section provides that no company covered by SOX or 鈥渁ny officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee鈥� in providing information of a potential violation of SOX. 18 U.S.C. 搂1514A(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to determine whether an employee of a private employer can invoke the SOX whistleblower provision against that private company, solely because the private company is a contractor of a SOX-covered entity. In the first SOX case it has accepted, the Court will review the First Circuit鈥檚 decision in Lawson v. FMR, LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), wherein the appeals court ruled that employees of privately-held companies are not covered by the Section 806 whistleblower protections of SOX even if their employer does business with a publicly-traded company. The Department of Labor鈥檚 (鈥淒OL鈥�) Administrative Review Board (鈥淎RB鈥�), however, reached the opposite conclusion in Spinner v. David Landau & Associates, LLC, ARB Nos. 10-111, 10-115 (May 31, 2012). Seeking to expand SOX鈥檚 reach, the ARB held that Section 806 applies to employees of privately-held companies if they have contracts with publicly-traded companies.
Lawson involved two former employees of privately-held companies providing investment advice and fund management services to publicly-held mutual funds. They claimed their employer had retaliated against them for reporting alleged improper registration statements and accounting practices in violation of SOX. Determining that this case did not fall within the protections of Section 806, the First Circuit court rejected the plaintiffs鈥� contention that an 鈥渆mployee鈥� afforded whistleblower protection under SOX includes not only the employees of public companies, but also the employees of that company鈥檚 contractors and subcontractors. See Lawson, 670 F.3d at 67-68. Further, the court found the meaning of 鈥渆mployee鈥� to be unambiguous within the context of Section 806 and that, under the Chevron case, the court therefore owed no deference to a contrary DOL interpretation. (The Supreme Court ruled in Chevron that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes will be upheld so long as they are reasonable.)
In contrast, Spinner considered whether the plaintiff, an employee of a privately-held internal auditing firm offering services to publicly-traded companies, was entitled to protection under Section 806. Finding in favor of the plaintiff and rejecting the First Circuit鈥檚 interpretation in Lawson, the ARB announced that 鈥渁ccountants employed by private accounting firms, who in turn provide SOX compliance services to publicly traded corporations, are covered as employees of contractors under Section 806.鈥�
The Supreme Court鈥檚 review of Lawson presents three important concerns:
- Whether Section 806 extends to employees of private companies who have contracts with public companies;
- How much deference federal courts should afford interpretations of the Department of Labor; and,
- Whether the Section 806 issue currently is ripe for review by the Supreme Court.
A Supreme Court ruling that Section 806 applies to employees of private contractors would expand the scope of the provision鈥檚 whistleblower protection greatly, while a contrary ruling will act as a restraint on the current ARB/DOL, which many consider to be seeking to expand the application of SOX. The Court likely will take this opportunity to decide whether federal courts should defer to the DOL鈥檚 construction of SOX, clarifying the proper relationship between federal courts and the DOL regarding interpretation of Section 806. Employers should continue to limit their exposure to retaliation claims by implementing strong internal reporting mechanisms and taking whistleblower complaints seriously.
B. Third Circuit adopts DOL鈥檚 liberal test for determining protected whistleblower activity under SOX
Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first federal Circuit Court to adopt the liberal 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard for determining protected activity under the whistleblower provisions of SOX. Wiest v. Lynch, No. 11-4257 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 2013). In doing so, the court rejected case law requiring a plaintiff-employee鈥檚 internal complaint to relate 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� to a statute or regulation specified in Section 806 of SOX in order for the employee鈥檚 communication to be considered protected activity. The Third Circuit鈥檚 holding represents a significant, employee-friendly development in cases brought under SOX鈥檚 whistleblower provision. The Court has jurisdiction over Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Jeffrey Wiest, a former accountant for the defendant company, filed a complaint alleging his former employer had terminated his employment in violation of SOX after he raised concerns to his supervisors about certain corporate expenditures. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the employer鈥檚 motion to dismiss Wiest鈥檚 claims. It found the concerns Wiest raised did not meet the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard announced by the ARB in Platone v. FLYi, ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006). Under the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard, to be protected, an employee鈥檚 communication regarding suspected fraud had to assert specific elements of securities fraud.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of two of the Wiest鈥檚 SOX retaliation claims. In doing so, the Court adopted the 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard first articulated by the ARB in Sylvester v. Parexel International, LLC, ARB No. 07-123, ALJ Nos. 2007-SOX-39, 42 (ARB May 25, 2011). Under the 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard, employees making internal communication regarding questionable conduct need only believe the objectionable conduct violates a SOX provision, provided that a person with the same training and experience also would think the complained-about conduct could violate the Act. Although Sylvester was announced in May 2011, no Circuit Court had adopted the decision or rejected the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard 鈥� until now. In fact, even after Sylvester, many district courts continued to use the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard in ruling on SOX whistleblower claims, leading even the DOL to wrestle with the impact of Sylvester on new SOX claims.
In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge Kent A. Jordan observed in Wiest that it would be difficult for an employer to know or suspect an employee has engaged in protected conduct if the employee does not adequately communicate his or her concerns in an understandable way to the employer. Judge Jordan echoed Platone when he observed that 鈥淸w]hat matters is not what is locked in the plaintiff鈥檚 mind or how the plaintiff may later describe his actions; it is what is communicated to the employer that counts.鈥�
Wiest represents a significant development in SOX jurisprudence. Moreover, it is an expansion of employee rights in this area of law that cannot be overstated. The decision makes an employer鈥檚 duty to investigate claims of corporate fraud more difficult and complicates an employer鈥檚 ability to take necessary employment action with respect to potential whistleblowers.
III. Government releases long-awaited Foreign Corrupt Practices Act resource guide
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (鈥淔CPA鈥�) prohibits bribery of foreign officials. Essentially, the FPCA prohibits an 鈥渋ssuer鈥� 鈥� a U.S. company that issues securities 鈥� or any of its officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders to: 1) make use of interstate commerce (mail or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce); 2) corruptly; 3) in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to; 4) a foreign official 鈥� directly or indirectly; 5) for the purpose of influencing that foreign official.
At the end of 2012, the Department of Justice (鈥淒OJ鈥�) and the SEC issued their much-awaited regulatory guidance entitled, 鈥淎 Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act.鈥� The guide is a comprehensive overview of the FCPA. More importantly, it describes the DOJ鈥檚 and the SEC鈥檚 enforcement approach and priorities in relation to the FCPA. Therefore, the guide, released November 14, 2012, provides critical insight as to how these regulatory and law enforcement organizations will assess potentially wrongful conduct within corporate organizations. It also offers insight on how these agencies will determine whether to hold an employer organization responsible for the misdeeds of its employees or agents.
The guide acknowledges that each investigation requires fact-specific review and analysis. It notes that presence of a corporate compliance program is a common factor in determining whether there will be organizational liability and whether the organization will be subject to prosecution, regulatory fines, or otherwise shielded from responsibility. In the guide, the DOJ and SEC take a 鈥渃ommon-sense and pragmatic approach鈥� to evaluating an organization鈥檚 compliance program by asking three simple, albeit broad, questions:
- Is the company鈥檚 compliance program well-designed?
- Is it being applied in good faith?
- Does it work?
Applying the guidance offered by the guide, the following are some of the 鈥渉allmarks鈥� of an effective compliance program:
- Commitment from senior management and a clearly articulated policy against corruption
- Code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures
- Oversight, autonomy, and resources
- Risk assessment
- Training and continuing advice
- Incentives and disciplinary measures
- Third-party due diligence and payments
- Confidential reporting and internal investigations
- Continuous Improvement: periodic testing and review
- Pre-acquisition due diligence and post-acquisition integration (in the context of mergers and acquisitions)
The new guide now makes clear that effective compliance programs not only are a requirement, but an essential tool for an organization鈥檚 own survival and well-being. Company boards, senior management teams, and corporate officers are unequivocally on notice that mediocre compliance programs represent a dereliction of duty. Moreover, compliance programs assist employers in successfully defending against whistleblower claims.
The time is now for employers to develop, update, or polish-off their corporate compliance programs. As important as any capital asset, a best practice corporate compliance program can literally mean the difference between an organization that prospers (notwithstanding the misdeeds of wayward employees) or an organization that falters in the face of an FCPA problem.
Related resources
Protections for whistleblowers: what employers need to know
Article provided courtesy of
Under federal and state laws, 鈥渨histleblowers鈥� 鈥� individuals who expose employer misconduct 鈥� are protected against retaliation under certain circumstances. However, with the growing array of statutes and regulations seeking to regulate whistleblowing, insurers and insureds should be well-versed in potential retaliation actions that may be asserted by employees who 鈥渂low the whistle.鈥� Discussed herein are recent developments concerning three of the most significant laws protecting whistleblowers: the Dodd-Frank Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Employers and insurers should note that many states also have whistleblowing protections that are broader than the protections available under federal statutes.
I. Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower protections require more than internal reporting, federal appeals court rules
In a departure from a steady stream of federal district court decisions broadly construing the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (鈥淒FA鈥�), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in New Orleans, has limited the scope of the term 鈥渨histleblower鈥� under those provisions to apply only to employees who actually report information relating to a violation of securities laws to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(鈥淪EC鈥�), thus reducing employers鈥� exposure to such claims. Asadi v. G.E. Energy, No. 12-20522 (5th Cir. July 17, 2013).
Khaled Asadi, a former G.E. Energy executive, alleged he was fired after reporting a possible securities law violation to his supervisor and the company鈥檚 regional ombudsman. Asadi claimed he was protected by the anti-retaliation provisions of the DFA, even though, indisputably, he did not provide any information to the SEC, and therefore, did not meet the express statutory definition of the term 鈥渨histleblower.鈥� Instead, he argued that his internal reports were protected based on purportedly conflicting language in the statute鈥檚 anti-retaliation provision. He argued that the DFA鈥檚 anti-retaliation provision protects those who make disclosures that are protected under SOX, even if they do not report a violation to the SEC.
Rejecting Asadi鈥檚 argument, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain language and structure of the statute compelled the conclusion that internal communications alone were not protected. It so doing, the Court disagreed with numerous district court decisions that have held to the contrary. See, e.g., Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41302 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 n.9 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). It also rejected the SEC鈥檚 similar administrative interpretation of the statute.
Based on district court decisions, many employers, not surprisingly, had begun to question whether internal reporting mechanisms they had adopted were simply a trap waiting to ensnare them in DFA whistleblower litigation, rather than the constructive vehicle they had envisioned for achieving compliance through transparency and self-regulation. The Fifth Circuit鈥檚 decision may provide a welcome tonic for employers鈥� concerns.
In light of Asadi, employers should re-evaluate and update their corporate internal reporting mechanisms or so-called whistleblower hotlines. Supported by employee awareness programs, these avenues of communication should encourage internal reporting. Adopting clear language and process, articulating strong assurances from senior management of protection from retaliation, and managing expectations of those who employ the procedure to make reports also are essential.
Employers must manage internal resources effectively. They must respond promptly, conduct diligent internal review, take appropriate corrective action, and self-report as warranted. Employees of organizations that deliver on their promises are less likely to resort to the SEC. While reporting to the SEC ultimately may be warranted in some situations, the employer will have the opportunity to be involved and in some measure to affect the course of events.
II. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
A. Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act apply to employees of private contractors? Supreme Court to give answer
Through Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (鈥淪OX鈥�), a federal statute that applies to publically-traded companies, Congress created a private cause of action for individuals who have suffered retaliation after reporting fraud or violations of securities regulations. The section provides that no company covered by SOX or 鈥渁ny officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee鈥� in providing information of a potential violation of SOX. 18 U.S.C. 搂1514A(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to determine whether an employee of a private employer can invoke the SOX whistleblower provision against that private company, solely because the private company is a contractor of a SOX-covered entity. In the first SOX case it has accepted, the Court will review the First Circuit鈥檚 decision in Lawson v. FMR, LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), wherein the appeals court ruled that employees of privately-held companies are not covered by the Section 806 whistleblower protections of SOX even if their employer does business with a publicly-traded company. The Department of Labor鈥檚 (鈥淒OL鈥�) Administrative Review Board (鈥淎RB鈥�), however, reached the opposite conclusion in Spinner v. David Landau & Associates, LLC, ARB Nos. 10-111, 10-115 (May 31, 2012). Seeking to expand SOX鈥檚 reach, the ARB held that Section 806 applies to employees of privately-held companies if they have contracts with publicly-traded companies.
Lawson involved two former employees of privately-held companies providing investment advice and fund management services to publicly-held mutual funds. They claimed their employer had retaliated against them for reporting alleged improper registration statements and accounting practices in violation of SOX. Determining that this case did not fall within the protections of Section 806, the First Circuit court rejected the plaintiffs鈥� contention that an 鈥渆mployee鈥� afforded whistleblower protection under SOX includes not only the employees of public companies, but also the employees of that company鈥檚 contractors and subcontractors. See Lawson, 670 F.3d at 67-68. Further, the court found the meaning of 鈥渆mployee鈥� to be unambiguous within the context of Section 806 and that, under the Chevron case, the court therefore owed no deference to a contrary DOL interpretation. (The Supreme Court ruled in Chevron that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes will be upheld so long as they are reasonable.)
In contrast, Spinner considered whether the plaintiff, an employee of a privately-held internal auditing firm offering services to publicly-traded companies, was entitled to protection under Section 806. Finding in favor of the plaintiff and rejecting the First Circuit鈥檚 interpretation in Lawson, the ARB announced that 鈥渁ccountants employed by private accounting firms, who in turn provide SOX compliance services to publicly traded corporations, are covered as employees of contractors under Section 806.鈥�
The Supreme Court鈥檚 review of Lawson presents three important concerns:
- Whether Section 806 extends to employees of private companies who have contracts with public companies;
- How much deference federal courts should afford interpretations of the Department of Labor; and,
- Whether the Section 806 issue currently is ripe for review by the Supreme Court.
A Supreme Court ruling that Section 806 applies to employees of private contractors would expand the scope of the provision鈥檚 whistleblower protection greatly, while a contrary ruling will act as a restraint on the current ARB/DOL, which many consider to be seeking to expand the application of SOX. The Court likely will take this opportunity to decide whether federal courts should defer to the DOL鈥檚 construction of SOX, clarifying the proper relationship between federal courts and the DOL regarding interpretation of Section 806. Employers should continue to limit their exposure to retaliation claims by implementing strong internal reporting mechanisms and taking whistleblower complaints seriously.
B. Third Circuit adopts DOL鈥檚 liberal test for determining protected whistleblower activity under SOX
Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first federal Circuit Court to adopt the liberal 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard for determining protected activity under the whistleblower provisions of SOX. Wiest v. Lynch, No. 11-4257 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 2013). In doing so, the court rejected case law requiring a plaintiff-employee鈥檚 internal complaint to relate 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� to a statute or regulation specified in Section 806 of SOX in order for the employee鈥檚 communication to be considered protected activity. The Third Circuit鈥檚 holding represents a significant, employee-friendly development in cases brought under SOX鈥檚 whistleblower provision. The Court has jurisdiction over Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Jeffrey Wiest, a former accountant for the defendant company, filed a complaint alleging his former employer had terminated his employment in violation of SOX after he raised concerns to his supervisors about certain corporate expenditures. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the employer鈥檚 motion to dismiss Wiest鈥檚 claims. It found the concerns Wiest raised did not meet the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard announced by the ARB in Platone v. FLYi, ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006). Under the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard, to be protected, an employee鈥檚 communication regarding suspected fraud had to assert specific elements of securities fraud.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of two of the Wiest鈥檚 SOX retaliation claims. In doing so, the Court adopted the 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard first articulated by the ARB in Sylvester v. Parexel International, LLC, ARB No. 07-123, ALJ Nos. 2007-SOX-39, 42 (ARB May 25, 2011). Under the 鈥渞easonable belief鈥� standard, employees making internal communication regarding questionable conduct need only believe the objectionable conduct violates a SOX provision, provided that a person with the same training and experience also would think the complained-about conduct could violate the Act. Although Sylvester was announced in May 2011, no Circuit Court had adopted the decision or rejected the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard 鈥� until now. In fact, even after Sylvester, many district courts continued to use the 鈥渄efinitively and specifically鈥� standard in ruling on SOX whistleblower claims, leading even the DOL to wrestle with the impact of Sylvester on new SOX claims.
In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge Kent A. Jordan observed in Wiest that it would be difficult for an employer to know or suspect an employee has engaged in protected conduct if the employee does not adequately communicate his or her concerns in an understandable way to the employer. Judge Jordan echoed Platone when he observed that 鈥淸w]hat matters is not what is locked in the plaintiff鈥檚 mind or how the plaintiff may later describe his actions; it is what is communicated to the employer that counts.鈥�
Wiest represents a significant development in SOX jurisprudence. Moreover, it is an expansion of employee rights in this area of law that cannot be overstated. The decision makes an employer鈥檚 duty to investigate claims of corporate fraud more difficult and complicates an employer鈥檚 ability to take necessary employment action with respect to potential whistleblowers.
III. Government releases long-awaited Foreign Corrupt Practices Act resource guide
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (鈥淔CPA鈥�) prohibits bribery of foreign officials. Essentially, the FPCA prohibits an 鈥渋ssuer鈥� 鈥� a U.S. company that issues securities 鈥� or any of its officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders to: 1) make use of interstate commerce (mail or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce); 2) corruptly; 3) in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to; 4) a foreign official 鈥� directly or indirectly; 5) for the purpose of influencing that foreign official.
At the end of 2012, the Department of Justice (鈥淒OJ鈥�) and the SEC issued their much-awaited regulatory guidance entitled, 鈥淎 Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act.鈥� The guide is a comprehensive overview of the FCPA. More importantly, it describes the DOJ鈥檚 and the SEC鈥檚 enforcement approach and priorities in relation to the FCPA. Therefore, the guide, released November 14, 2012, provides critical insight as to how these regulatory and law enforcement organizations will assess potentially wrongful conduct within corporate organizations. It also offers insight on how these agencies will determine whether to hold an employer organization responsible for the misdeeds of its employees or agents.
The guide acknowledges that each investigation requires fact-specific review and analysis. It notes that presence of a corporate compliance program is a common factor in determining whether there will be organizational liability and whether the organization will be subject to prosecution, regulatory fines, or otherwise shielded from responsibility. In the guide, the DOJ and SEC take a 鈥渃ommon-sense and pragmatic approach鈥� to evaluating an organization鈥檚 compliance program by asking three simple, albeit broad, questions:
- Is the company鈥檚 compliance program well-designed?
- Is it being applied in good faith?
- Does it work?
Applying the guidance offered by the guide, the following are some of the 鈥渉allmarks鈥� of an effective compliance program:
- Commitment from senior management and a clearly articulated policy against corruption
- Code of conduct and compliance policies and procedures
- Oversight, autonomy, and resources
- Risk assessment
- Training and continuing advice
- Incentives and disciplinary measures
- Third-party due diligence and payments
- Confidential reporting and internal investigations
- Continuous Improvement: periodic testing and review
- Pre-acquisition due diligence and post-acquisition integration (in the context of mergers and acquisitions)
The new guide now makes clear that effective compliance programs not only are a requirement, but an essential tool for an organization鈥檚 own survival and well-being. Company boards, senior management teams, and corporate officers are unequivocally on notice that mediocre compliance programs represent a dereliction of duty. Moreover, compliance programs assist employers in successfully defending against whistleblower claims.
The time is now for employers to develop, update, or polish-off their corporate compliance programs. As important as any capital asset, a best practice corporate compliance program can literally mean the difference between an organization that prospers (notwithstanding the misdeeds of wayward employees) or an organization that falters in the face of an FCPA problem.